Hume’s principle: “For any concepts F and G, the number of Fs is the number of Gs iff F and G can be put into one-one correspondence.”
Wright says that we can regard Hume’s principle as an abstraction principle as “formative of the concept that [it] introduces”. If this is the case then, Wright says, “the analyticity of such a principle is consequent on our assigning to it just such a role” (226). If we stipulate that Hume’s principle creates the concept that it introduces, then we have chosen to organize our concepts so that anything that conflicts with it (i.e. the Nuisance Principle) is analytically false.
Heck says that Frege needed to take number and emperors (indeed all objects) to be of the same sort because (in order to prove the axiom of infinity) numbers need to be the sort of thing that can be counted.
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AnnieS - 14 Nov 2006
Topic revision: r1 - 14 Nov 2006 - 18:52:50 -
AnnieS