Introduction:

In “On Defining ‘Good’,” Moore argues that the subject matter of Ethics is the question, “what is good?” Furthermore, he argues that the concept “good” is simple, unanalyzable, and indefinable. Thus, he places him self in marked contrast with the majority of Ethical views which take “good” to be reducible to things like pleasure, desirability, or approval.

Good: An Intrinsic Value

Moore is adamant in claiming that good is a “simple notion” that cannot be defined in any way. But then, near the end of the article, Moore says the following:

Every one does in fact understand the question “Is this good?” When he thinks of it, his state of mind is different from what it would be, were he asked “Is this pleasant, or desired, or approved?” It has a distinct meaning for him, even though he may not recognize in what respect it is distinct. Whenever he thinks of “intrinsic value,” or “intrinsic worth,” or says that a thing “ought to exist,” he has before his mind the unique object—the unique property of things—which I mean by “good.” (321)

I found this passage a little confusing because here, in a very clear statement (unless I am reading it out of context), Moore seems to identify good with “intrinsic value.” But this sort of definition, or identification, is the precise thing which Moore argues one cannot provide for “good.” He seems to be saying that when we say of something, “this is good,” we are picking out a property of the thing in question—a property which is also picked out by “good.”

But, having examined the passage and striving to be charitable, I now think that Moore’s claim is not problematic. What he has to mean (in keeping with the spirit of the rest of the article) is that the property of goodness is a property that is intrinsically valuable (just as it also might be a property that is pleasurable or desirable)—not that good just is, or is defined as, intrinsic value.

“Good” and “the Good”

Moore makes a distinction between “the Good” and “Good.” “Good” is an adjective that we apply to something substantive. This substantive thing forms part of “the Good,” which is the “whole of that to which the adjective will apply, and the adjective must always truly apply to it” (317). Thus, if one can apply the adjective “Good” to “the Good,” they cannot be identical with one another and are necessarily distinct.

Mistaken Good Judgments

When Moore states that good is indefinable, he is not saying that statements like the following are always false:

1. “Good is pleasure.”
2. “Good is that which is desired.”

Rather, whether these statements are true or false depends upon what one means by them. If, in stating (1) or (2), one is simply saying that most people have used the word “good” to mean either of these things, then the statements may be true (but uninformative to the discussion of ethics). In a similar vein, if one is using the verb “to be” in these statements as a verb of predication, then these statements may or may not be false depending on the way the world is.

Moore’s comments, however, are referring to a different use of the statements. Consider the first statement. If I utter it and intend to be saying that good just is pleasure, that good is identical to pleasure and nothing over and above it, then Moore would hold that I am uttering a false statement. Moore believes that any statement which tries to draw an identity between good and some other natural thing is doomed to failure. Thus, if I am intending to give a substantive definition of the true nature of good, I fail to utter a true sentence because good is indefinable for Moore.

Simple Notions: Yellow & Green?

Moore claims that yellow and good are both simple notions in that one can never explain these two things to anyone else who does not already know what they are. Simple notions, by their very definition, are not complex entities, but are rather something which you can simply think or perceive. When we describe complex entities, on the other hand, we describe their numerous properties and qualities—properties and qualities that can be reduced until we finally reach simple notions which cannot be further explained in other terms. Thus, simple notions form the basis of our descriptions of complex entities, but cannot themselves be further described.

But the question arises: Is green a simple notion? For, as any artist can tell you, green is yellow plus blue. I really don’t know what to think about this question for several reasons. First, I am not quite sure how to answer the question: In general, what is color? Moore makes several assumptions about the nature of color, but I am not so sure. Is it an objective feature of the world or is it merely a perceived-dependent property? It seems that a lot would hang on this question—indeed, even the question of whether yellow is a simple notion. If we can reduce all colors to certain objective features of the world, such as light and surface reflectance properties, then no color is “simple” in the sense that it cannot be further described. How about if we reduce color to certain frequencies of light and argue that green is merely a light wave somewhere between 520 and 570 nanometers? But if such physical facts about the world cannot capture Mary’s apple, then perhaps colors are really perceiver-dependent and rest on qualitative experience. Is the qualitative experience of seeing green identical with the qualitative experience of seeing yellow plus blue? Perhaps. But if so, then the colors I see now (all of which I regard to be “basic” in a certain sense) are not really basic at all, but rather simply combinations of three hues. If colors are perceiver-dependent, as Moore appears to argue, I think it would be weird to say that the experience of green is merely the addition of the experience of seeing yellow and the experience of seeing blue. I’m not sure what it means to say that we can add experiences up and sum them to make other experiences.

If I am trying to describe the color to someone who knows what “color” is generally, but has not attained the concept “green” yet, I may try to describe it by referring to objects (such as grass) that commonly “display” the color. If that fails, I may try to mix some colors on a palette to show her the color. But I am not sure that by doing either of these things I am really getting at the “definition” of “green.” That is, I am not sure I am getting at its essence rather than simply demonstrating it in a certain way. I do not believe that the “essence” of “green” is yellow plus blue.

Finally, I am not a color wizard, but I thought that the formula “green = yellow + blue” only works for objects that use reflected light to produce colors (such as printing on a page, t-shirt dyes, etc.). In these applications, we use yellow, cyan, and magenta to produce colors on a white (or relatively white) surface. But in applications that use emitted light (as opposed to reflected light), green is one of the basic primary colors that are used to create the spectrum. Thus, our television sets use red, green, and blue to create a wide range of colors. I’m not sure if I’m completely up to date on the technology, but here we seem to have conflicting notions of what green is. According to the reflective color system, green is yellow plus blue. But according to the emitted light system, green is a primary color.

-- DanielS - 28 Nov 2005